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CASE COMMENTS
TAXATION - SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS - A DISTRIBUTION OF
PROPERTY WILL QUALIFY AS A DISTRSBUTION OF PREVIOUSLY TAXED INCOME
TO THE SHAREHOLDERS OF A SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATION AND WILL NOT BE
TAXED EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY EXCEEDS ITS TAX BASIS TO THE CORPORATION. - On December 31,
1960, Marie L. DeTrevill received a check for $17,631.34 from Forest Land
Company, Inc., a qualifying small business corporation.' This represented her
portion of a total of $212,868.64 paid on that day to the shareholders of the
corporation as a distribution of undistributed taxable income and previously taxed
income. On January 6, 1961, DeTreville and the other shareholders issued checks
to Forest for the purchase of shares of stock in the Mount Vernon Life Insurance
Co. in substantially the same amounts as they had received on December 31,
-1960.The Internal Revenue Service found these transactions to be a sham. It
determined that there was, in fact, only one transaction involving a distribution of
property, not cash, and that it did not qualify as a tax-free distribution of pre-
viously taxed income under Treasury Regulation 1.1375-4(b).2 On the basis
of these findings, DeTreville was assessed and paid additional personal income
tax in the amount of $9,862.47. In an action to recover the amount, the court
held: a distribution of property will qualify as a distribution of previously taxed
income to the extent of the basis of the distributing corporation in the property,
and only that portion of the value of the property which represents the excess of
the fair market value over the basis will be subject to tax in the hands of the
shareholders; insofar as Treasury Regulation 1.1375-4(b) states otherwise, it is
invalid. DeTreville v. U.S., CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS.
(70-1, at 82,695) If 9163 (D. S.C. Dec. 10, 1969).
On the surface, the holding of the court does not seem to disturb the law of
small business corporations. The holding invalid of a Treasury Regulation as an
attempt to "impose or add conditions or qualifications not imposed by Congress
or within the Congressional purpose" is neither new nor unusual.' The impact
1 INT. RIVV. CODE of 1954, § 1371(a).
2 Treasury Regulation § 1.1375-4(b) provides that:
Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, any actual distribution
of money by an electing small business corporation to a shareholder which, but for
the operation of this section, would be a dividend out of accumulated earnings and
profits shall be considered a distribution of previously taxed income to the extent
of the shareholder's net share of previously taxed income immediately before the
distribution. Thus, a distribution of property other than money or a distribution
in exchange for stock, or a constructive distribution under section 1373(b), is never
a distribution of previously taxed income. Since current earnings and profits are
first applied to distributions of money which are not (1) in exchange for stock, or
(2) distributions of the corporation's undistributed taxable income for the im-
mediately preceding taxable year under section 1375(f) and § 1.1375-6 (see para-
graphs (d) and (e) of § 1.1373-1), a distribution of previously taxed income
may occur only if during its taxable year the corporation makes such money dis-
tributions in excess of its earnings and profits for such taxable year. (See § 1.1375-5
for rules with respect to certain distributions of money which may be treated as
having been made in a preceding taxable year.)
3 DeTrzville v. U.S., CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX RnP., ,U.S. TAX CAs. (70-1, at
82,695) ff 9163 (D. S.C. Dec. 10, 1969).
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of such a holding may, however, be severe if the regulation invalidated constitutes
an integral part of a scheme or plan sought to be achieved by the legislature.
The small business corporation (referred to as the "Sub S corporation") 4
is part of a special category which has been carved out of the ordinary corporate
tax law5 by what has beeen called "a novel scheme of statutory provisions."6
The "scheme" which does this "carving" is subchapter S of chapter 1 of the
Internal Revenue Code.' Subchapter S contains only eight sections' and, as such,
is by no means self-contained or all-inclusive. It simply denominates the manner
in which Sub S corporations differ from other corporations under chapter 1.
Other provisions of chapter 1 of the Code that are not inconsistent with sub-
chapter S still apply to a Sub S corporation in the same manner that they apply to
any other corporation.9
With few exceptions,'" a Sub S corporation determines taxable income in the
same manner as any other corporation." The basic difference between a Sub S
corporation and an ordinary corporation is that the Sub S corporation is not
"subject to taxes imposed by" the normal corporate law." The intent of the
lawmakers was to allow the small business corporation to be taxed like a partner-
ship.' The likenesses between a Sub S corporation and a partnership extend
basically to the point where the income of the entity is "passed through" to the
shareholder.'4 This income is included by the shareholder in his own gross in-
come.'5 The net effect is, of course, escape from the "double taxation" normally
experienced by the corporate income that is distributed to shareholders.'
If this were the full extent of the operation of Subchapter S, it would appear
that there would be few problems. Shareholders, however, are not content to pay
taxes on income that simply accumulates in the coffers of the entity in which they
have part ownership. They want their share of the profits distributed to them.
It is at this point that the highly technical, accounting-oriented aspects of sub-
chapter S come into play to temper the wishes of such shareholders.
Initially, it is important to note that "earnings and profits of an electing
[Sub S] corporation may, in some cases, exceed the taxable income of the corpora-
tion."" This will be true in cases where statutory deductions' from earnings and
4 This commonly used term refers to the heading found before INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§§ 1371-78: SUBCHAPTER S- ELECTION OF CERTAIN SMALL BUSINESS CORPORATIONS AS TO
TAXABLE STATUS.
5 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, ch.l.
6 7 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 41B.24 (rev. ed. 1967).
7 The Internal Revenue Code is Title 26 of the United States Code.
8 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371-78.
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-1(c), T.D. 6960, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 342.
10 Under section 1373(d), a Sub S corporation's income determination may not include
deductions for:
a. net operating loss carrybacks or carryovers;
b. dividends received from other corporations;
c. certain tax exempt interest; and
d. dividends from certain preferred stock.
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(c), T.D. 6960, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 342.
12 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(b).
13 S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 218-19 (1958).
14 7 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 41B.24 (rev. ed. 1967).
15 INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 1373(a).
16 S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 218-19 (1958).
17 178 BNA TAx MGMT. PORTFOLIO B-11 (1968).
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profits are allowed before arriving at taxable income. An example of one such
deduction is the percentage depletion allowance on the extraction of natural
resources. "' In this case a certain amount of earnings and profits has escaped
taxation on the corporate level. If the corporation were a Sub S corporation these
earnings would also escape taxation (temporarily) on the shareholder level,
because they do not represent any portion of the undistributed taxable income
required to be included in the shareholders' gross incomes. 20 It is for this reason
that subchapter S distinguishes between undistributed taxable income [UTI] and
earnings and profits [E&P].
The determination of the amount of UTI and its allocation is accomplished
by use of the statutory fiction of a constructive dividend, an amount equal to
that which a shareholder
would have received as a dividend, if on [the] last day of the taxable year
there had been distributed pro rata to its shareholders by [the] corporation
an amount equal to the corporation's undistributed taxable income for the
corporation's taxable year.
21
For purposes of this fiction, UTI is decreased by the amount of money that has
been distributed during the taxable year.22 It is extremely important to note that
only money distributions are excludable from UTI, and that an elaborate set of
regulations governs the tax consequences of property distributions made during
the year.' These regulations state explicitly that "for the purposes of section
1373 (c) a distribution of money does not include a distribution of... property
other than money in satisfaction of a dividend declared in money."' For this
reason, "a property dividend may unexpectedly enlarge the amount of dividend
income taxed to the shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation, so that they
will be taxed on more than the current earnings of the corporation."2 5
After E&P and UTI have been determined for the taxable year, E&P is
reduced by the amount of UTI before the recognition of money distributions..
20
Money distributions are then deducted and the adjusted UTI amount applied to
increase the basis of the shareholders' stock.27 The net effect of this manipulation
is to put the UTI in a position in which it cannot be distributed prior to the
distribution of E&P. This applied UTI is now generally known as previously
taxed income [PTI]. The PTI is "locked in ' '"2 because any corporate distributions
are made first out of B&P" and are taxable as such. This would seem to leave
18 These "statutory deductions" are in contradistinction to "accounting deductions" which
have a basis in the actual operations of the corporation. "Accounting deductions" are ex-
penses actually or soon to be incurred (accruals), whereas statutory deductions need not
necessarily meet this same standard.
19 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 613(a)-(b).
20 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1373(a).
21 Id. § 1373(b).
22 Id. § 1373(c).
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1, T.D. 6960, 1968-2 Cum. BuLL. 342.
24 Id. § 1.1373-1(d).
25 7 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOMe TAXATION § 41B.27 (rev. ed. 1967).
26 INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954-, § 1377(a).
27 Id. § 1376(a).
28 60-4th BNA TAx MGmT. PORTFOLIO A-40 (1969).
29 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 316(a).
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Sub S corporation shareholders in an untenable position, since the earnings upon
which they have paid taxes are unavailable, on a tax-free basis, until after E&P
have been distributed. This dilemma is remedied, however, by section 1375 (d)
of the Code which allows the distribution of PTI before E&P. Until DeTreville,
the distribution of PTI was limited solely to money distributions. This stipulation
was not found on the face of section 1375 (d) but rather in Treasury Regulation
1.1375-4(b) which states that "a distribution of property other than money or a
distribution in exchange for stock, or a constructive distribution under section
1373 (b), is never a distribution of previously taxed income.""0
In DeTreville, the court found that prior to making its Subchapter S election
Forest Land Co., Inc. had an accumulated surplus [E&P] of about $500,000'
(The term "surplus" was treated by the court as synonymous with "earnings and
profits.") This accumulated E&P did not qualify as PTI, although it may have
been taxed once at the corporate level, because no PTI account can exist, nor
can PTI be accumulated, except as provided in Subchapter S.2
The court also found that Forest's PTI after the close of its 1960 books
totaled $212, 868.64 s The company had no current E&P or UTI because the
1961 tax year had not yet begun.
Since one of the findings of fact was that the transaction was a subterfuge
and constituted a distribution of property out of PTI,34 the court would of neces-
sity have found January 6, 1961 (when the shareholders purchased shares of
Mount Vernon stock) to be the date of the transaction rather than December 31,
1960 (the date when Forest paid the shareholders). The 1960 UTI would not
have become PTI until after the close of business on December 31, 1960."
The most critical question then is: what would the decision have been had
the court found December 31, 196036 to be the date of the distribution of the
property?
In such a case, $84,801.10" still would have been UTI under section 1373
of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that UTI
means taxable income . . . minus the amount of money distributed as
dividends during the taxable year, to the extent that any such amount is a
distribution out of earnings and profits of the taxable year as specified in
section 316(a) (2) '(emphasis added).31s
Since money alone is allowed to be deducted from UTI for purposes of determin-
30 Treasury Reg. § 1.1375-4(b), T.D. 6960, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 342.
31 DeTreville v. U.S., CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX Rnp., U.S. TAX CAS. (70-1, at 82,695)
f 9163 (D. S.C. Dec. 10, 1969).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. It was specifically stated that PTI was comprised of $128,607.54 from 1959 and
$158,183.84, less $73,382.74 cash distributions, from 1960.
35 The court's arithmetic appears a bit faulty in this portion of the opinion. $128,607.54
plus $158,183.84 less $73,382.74 equals $213,408.64, not $212,408.64. The court simply used
the purported value of the stock distributed as the total amount of PTI available for distribu-
tion. Actually, available PTI exceeded the value of the stock by $540.00.
36 December 31, 1960 is the date that the checks were issued by Forest to its share-
holders.
37 $158,183.84 of UTI for 1960 less the $73,382.74 distributed in money during the year.
38 As was stated above, E&P can in some instances exceed UTI. Consequently section 1373
uses the broader term so that no distributions made during the taxable year escape taxation.
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ing the amounts that should be included in individual -gross income, the stock-
holders would be forced to include the $84,801.10 of UTI in their gross incomes
with no deduction allowed for the value of the stock distributed. It would then
have to be argued that the value of thestock comes out of PTI anyway and that
UTI does not have any bearing on the issue.
This, however, is not applicable in the instant case. PTI from Forest's first
year of election of Subchapter S status amounted to only $128,607.54.
This was* already used up by an equal amount in the value of the
stock distributed.- Since the total value of the stock distributed was -$212,868.64,
the remaining $84,801.10, regardless of the fact that it cannot come
out of UTI or PTI, must be distributed from some corporate fund.
The fact is, of course, that it is distributed out of the $500,000.00 of E&P
accumulated by Forest before it elected Subchapter S status. This necessary con-
clusion has a drastic effect on the shareholder's individual tax. Since the E&P
were not previously taxed to the individuals, any distribution therefrom is in-
cludible in individual gross income, as are UTI and money distributions during
the taxable year3 9 The occurrence of such a situation will leave the taxpayer
reflecting upon the admonition that
the distinction made between property and money dividends, excluding the
former from being a subtraction in determining the undistributed taxable
income, creates hazards which require caution before undertaking a property
distribution by a subchapter S corporation. 40
From this analysis it would appear that the plaintiff escaped extreme tax
consequences by no more than one week. The property distribution could have
taken place on January 1, 1961, a difference of only one day, and the result would
have been the same. It would seem, therefore, that the court would be compelled
by statute, rather than regulation, to hold that the difference between being
taxed and not being taxed on a distribution of property is the difference be-
tween the close of business on December 31 and the opening of business on
January 1, and that had the transaction taken place before the close of business
on December 31, 1960, it would have meant a large amount of.additional tax
for the shareholders. 41
This circumstance is, of, course, directly a product of the holding in De-
Treville. If a shareholder or Sub S corporation sought a distribution of property
it could simply wait until UTI became PTI to make the distribution tax-free.
In the alternative, if there were sufficient accumulated PTI, it could deem that
the distribution was made from such accumulation.
In the opinion, the court focuses primarily on the fact that the stork dig-
39 Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(g) (4),, T.D. 6960, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 342.
40 7 J. MiRTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXAT1iO § 41B.27 (4ev. ed. 1967).
41 The amount of additional tax which would need to be paid is, of course, a function
of the tax bracket within which the individual shareholder falls. As a group, however, the
shareholders of Forest Land Co., Inc. would be faced with including a, total of $242,984.94
in their individual gross incomes as opposed to $158,183.84.




tributed had a tax basis of only $17.77 per share. This basis was lower than
the value of $22.50 assigned by Forest at the time of the distribution.
The assigned value was achieved by a well-thought-out plan utilized by
Forest when it purchased Mount Vernon's stock. Forest executed two subscrip-
tion contracts for the purchase of the stock. One contract was for 10,866 shares,
and for this block of stock property with a book value (and tax basis) of
$244,472.21 was transferred to Mount Vernon. This gave the stock received
a tax basis of approximately $22.50 per share. The second subscription con-
tract was for 2,890 shares of Mount Vernon stock, and for these shares Forest
transferred property with no book value or tax basis. Obviously, then, the stock
received under this contract had no tax basis per share.
The determination of how these "transactions" should be viewed was what
the court considered the main issue in DeTreville. The court found that:
It is obvious that this attempt by the Corporation to create different tax
bases for the stock acquired by it in the Insurance Company cannot be
sustained. The Corporation was making simultaneous transfers to the
Insurance Company for Insurance Company stock. Its subscription must
be viewed and valued as a whole; and each share of stock subscribed for
acquired [sic] and must be given a like tax basis. Accordingly, the Corpora-
tion took its stock in the Insurance Company with a tax basis of $17.77
per share.
42
The basic concern then, as the court sees it, is to make sure that "such
excess ($22.50 $17.77 = $4.73) cannot pass to the distributee-stockholder as
previously taxed profit."'3 To the extent that Treasury Regulation 1.1375-4(b)
did not bear directly on this point, the court found
no reason why the tax basis of such stock, to the extent of previously taxed
but undistributed profits of the Corporation, should not be permitted to
pass, undiminished by the imposition of a second tax, to the stockholder-
distributee.
44
At this point, it is obvious that the court and the defendant are arguing at
cross-purposes; one argues stock basis and the other argues the nature of PTI.
To this extent, the court does not address itself to the critical issue posed by the
Government, i.e., why it should not be entitled to keep the taxes collected by
virtue of section 1375(d) and interpretive regulations.
The finding that Treasury Regulation 1.1375-4(b) is invalid constitutes
one of those perfunctory acts which a court sometimes performs when it con-
siders the crux of the matter to have been decided and the remaining questions
to be merely incidental. It appears, on the basis of the limited discussion ac-
corded the argument of the defendant, that the court felt the issue of the
Treasury Regulation to be no more than ancillary. The closest the court
comes to treating this question is in a short discussion in which it points
42 DeTreville v. U.S., CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAx REP., U.S. TAX CAs. (70-1, at 82,695)





out language in section 1375(a) (1) and (b) to the effect that a non-tax-
able distribution "is described in terms of a distribution of property out of
earnings and profits of the taxable year as specified in Section 316(a) (2)." 45
The court, however, ignores the fact that section 1375 (a) constitutes
a very important exception to the general rule that, despite the "pass
through" to the stockholders of the amount of income of the Subchapter S
corporation the character of the income in the corporation's hands does
not likewise "pass through" to shareholders .... 41
and that section 1375(b) is peripheral to the subject of UTI and PTI since it
provides that a distribution of current earnings or PTI is not to be considered
a dividend for purposes of computing the retirement income credit47 or the
dividend exclusion.4 The court could have arrived at the defendant's position
by. taking a closer look at the language in section 1375 (f) which it discarded in
favor of the above language.
Section 1375(f) is known as the "2y/2 month rule." It states that any
distribution of money made within 2/2 months after the close of the taxable
year "shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be considered a distribution which is
not a dividend, and the eamings and profits of the corporation shall not be
reduced by reason of such distribution." This is nothing more than an exten-
sion of the time within which distributions of money will be considered made
out of UTI, and not PTI or E&P. The significance of this section is that it
continues to limit these distributions to money. The term "property" could have
been used, as it was in section 1375(a) and (b). It-was not used, however, be-
cause the continuity of limiting distributions from UTI to money would have
been broken. This, coupled with the fact that UTI goes to PTI after the
taxable year, indicates that the limiting of distributions to money should follow
UTI into PTI. The DeTreville court, however, discarded language pertinent
to the UTI-PTI question in favor of language from sections not bearing on the
point.
The court deals the deciding blow to the defendant's case with the assertion
that
certainly, Section 316, 26 U.S.C., to which the statute points for clarifica-
tion of the type of distribution qualifying under Section 1375, does not
support the argument of the defendant. Under that Section, a distribution
may qualify, whether it be in money or in property. [Citing Edmister v.
C..R. 391 F.2d 584, 585 (6th Cir. 1968)].--
In this, the court is absolutely correct. A distribution of property may qualify
as a dividend under section 316, but only as a distribution
(1) out of ... earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or
45 Id.
46 7 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION § 41B.35 (rev. ed. 1967).
47 INT. REV. CODE; of 1954, § 37.
48 Id. § 116.
49 DeTreville v. U.S., CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAx REP., U.S. TAx CAs. (70-1, at
82,695) 11 9163 (D. S.C. Dec. 10, 1969).
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(2). out of .. .earnings and profits of the taxable year (computed as of
the close of the taxable year without diminution by reason of any dis-
tribution made during the taxable year), without regard to the amount
of the earnings and profits at the time the distribution was made.
Except as otherwise provided ... , every distribution is made out of
earnings and profits. (Emphasis added.) 50
Section 316 contemplates no such thing as PTI or UTI. Thus, any distribution
made pursuant to section 316 would be taxable as a distribution out of previously
untaxed E&P. This fact serves only to buttress the defendant's case.
The net effect of DeTreville seems to be more than the simple overruling of
a Treasury Regulation, Due to the scheme of Subchapter S, other provisions
have been affected; parts of section 1373 have been emasculated. The stipulation
that only money will be allowed as a deduction from UTI has no teeth if the
corporation can simply wait until UTI becomes PTI to make distributions that
are not in the form of money. There may be other grounds, upon which the
court could have reached the same conclusions, that would make the holding
in the case more viable. A discussion of the conceptual differences between UTI
and PTI might have been used to support the invalidation of the regulation,
or there is the argument that anything with a high degree of liquidity and a
ready market constitutes money. Unfortunately, in the light of the court's
decision, this becomes mere conjecture.
On the basis of the foregoing, the only conclusion that can be reached re-
garding the validity of Treasury Regulation 1.1375-4(b) is that it did not
"impose or add conditions or qualifications not imposed by Congressional pur-
pose" and that it was "necessary to make effective the statutory intent."51
Robert Salatka
TORTS - RESCUE DOCTRINE - RESCUERS OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES
ARE ALLOWED RECOVERY WHERE DANGER TO THE VICTIM WAS A RESULT
OF A BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY. '- On October 2, 1957, a sewer repair
team, headed by engineer John J. Rooney, entered a sewer in the city of New
York. Rooney tested for poisonous gas and found none. Wearing gas masks,
Rooney and a member of his crew, Fattore, entered a lateral tunnel, laving
Guarino at the bottom of the vertical shaft, Messina at the next highest level,
and four other men at various other levels. While returning to the vertical shaft,
Rooney collapsed. Unable to move Rooney by himself, Fattore removed his own
gas mask and called for help. Guarino and Messina entered the tunnel without
masks to give assistance. The four other members of the crew likewise entered
the sewer in response to the call for help. Rooney was dead of asphyxiation,
due to a faulty gas mask. Guarino and Messina died two days later. Fattore
and the other four men suffered various injuries from the poisonous gas.
The surviving crew members, Mirabile, Marino, Dagnell, Colello and
50 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 316.
51 DeTrxville v. U.S., CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (70-1, at
82,695) 9163 (D. S.C. Dec. 10, 1969).
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Fattore, and the estates of Guarino and Messina, brought actions against the Mine
Safety Appliance Company for wrongfl death and personhl-injliries sustained
in attempting to rescue Rooney. At trial,' judgments were enteredfor.the plain-
tiffs. The Appelate Division affirmed. On appeal, the Court- 6f..Appeals of New
York affirmed the judgment below and held: a rescuer or his representative may
recover for injuries or wrongful death suffered when responding to the danger6us
situation of a victim, when such situation is creatdd by the breach of an implied
warranty of a manufacturer. Guarino v. Mine Safety, Appliance Co:, 25 N.Y.2d
460, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942, 255 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
The rescue doctrine states that a rescuer who acts to save someone imperiled
by the wrongful act of another may maintain a cause of action against the
wrongdoer. The doctrine had its beginnings in the United States in 1871 in
the' New York case of Eckert v. Long Island R.R.2 In that case, the question
before the court was whether or not a plaintiff had been contributorily negligent
when he acted to rescue a child from the path of a fast-approaching train.5 In
holding that he was not, the court noted that: "The law has so high a regard
for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it
unless made under such circumstances as to constitute rashness 'in the judgment
of prudent persons."'4 The opinion of the Eckert court was soon recognized by
other courts as a significant statement on the law of rescuers.' It was aptly
described "as tending to foster a proper spirit of generous impulses toward
persons who are in danger."'
- The landmark decision in the area came with the opinion of Judge Cardozo
in Wagner v. International Ry.7 In his formulation of what is now generally
recognized as the rescue doctrine, Cardozo phrased the general rule with a broad
scope: "[T]he-wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it
is a wrong also to his rescuer."' With this declaration, Cardozo emphasized the
social policy that persons undertaking risks for the purpose of saving endangered
lives should be encouraged.
The next major development of the doctrine came in 1946, in the' case
of Carney v. Buyea,9 when recovery was- granted a rescuer despite the fact that
the pdrson rescued had negligently produced the perilous. situation1 0 In that
case, the defendant had placed herself in front of her own automobile which
she had failed to securely brake. Plaintiff received injuries while. rescuing her from
in front of the rolling car. Later, in plaintiff's suit against her, the defendant
argued that since she could not be negligent against herelf, there could be no
negligence to her upon which the protection of the rescue doctrine could arise.
1 Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921)
2 Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502, 3 Am. R. 721 (1871).
3 Id. at 505, 3 Am. R. at 723.
4 Id. at 506, 3 Am. R. at 723.
5 Peyton v. Texas & P. Ry., 41 La. Ann. 861, 6 So. 690 (1889); Lennehan v. Sampon,
126 Mass. 506 (1879); Donahoe v. Wabash, St.L. & P. Ry., 83 Mo. 560 (1884); Gibney
v. New York, 137 N.Y. 1, 33 N.E. 142 (1893); Pennsylvania Co. v. Langdendorff, 48 Ohio
St. 316, 28 N.E. 172 (1891).
6 Peyton v. Texas & P. Ry., 41 La. Ann. 861, 864, 6 So. 690, 691 (1889).
7 Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437, (1921).
8 Id. at 180, 133 N.E. at 437.
9 Carney v. Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902, (1946).
10 Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 16 N.W.2d 668 (1944).
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The court stated that a lack of self-protective care may be negligence toward
a person in the vicinity if that person is injured while undertaking a rescue.'1
An6ther dimension was added in 1960 to the rescue doctrine in New York.
In Talbert v. Talbett,2 the rescuer was allowed to recover for injuries received
when rescuing the defendant from his own suicide. The court found that th6.
suicide attempt "was wrongful to plaintiff because it caused that undue risk
of injury to the defendant which consequently brought about the attempt to
rescue him to' plaintiff's injury."' "
While these cases represent expansion of the rescue doctrine, recovery has
not been allowed in all instances. In Sirianni v. Anna, 4 for example, a mother
had surrendered a kidney to her son, who had lost his kidneys because of the
negligence of the defendants. In her suit against the defendants, she urged re-
covery under the rescue doctrine. The court denied recovery, concluding that
the negligence of the defendants had come to rest in the son. The action of the
mother could not rekindle it to provide a basis for her recovery."5 The court
found that there was no longer a "wrong" upon which to base the rescue
doctrine.'6
The doctrine has been applied in most jurisdictions throughout the United
States, but the cases have so strongly associated the rescue doctrine with negli-
gence actions that it is frequently stated that "a person, who is injured while
attempting to rescue one put in peril through the negligence of a third party,
can recover from that party."" (Emphasis added.) There is, however, no
reason to limit the doctrine solely to cases arising out of negligence." This was
aptly illustrated by the Court of' Appeals of New York in the Guarino case.
It is well to, note at this point that the estate of John J. Rooney, the engineer
whose gas mask failed in the sewer tunnel, brought an earlier, separate suit
against Mine Safety Appliance Company for Rooney's wrongful death.'9 Basing
its claim on Mine Safety's breach of an implied warranty of merchantibility of
the gas mask that failed, it was successful and recovered from Mine Safety.
The fact that there was a breach of an. implied warranty of merchantibility
was thus res judicata when Guarino and the other men in the tunnel brought
their actions against Mine Safety. This gave the Guarino court the factual
11 Carney v. Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 344, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902, 908 (1946).
12 Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc.2d 782, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1960).
13 Id. at 785, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
14 Sirianni v. Anna, 55 Misc.2d 553, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1967).
15 Id. at .555,.285 N.Y.S.2d at 712. The court quoted Judge Desmond's opinion in Williams
v. New York, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 223 N.E.2d 343, where he explained the
denial of recovery in that case: "Impossibility of entertaining this suit comes not so much
from difficulty in measuring the alleged damages as from the absence from our legal concept
of any such idea as a 'wrong' . .. ."
16 Id. at 556, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
17 Carney v. Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1946). The doctrine is often
seen as an exception to the rule of contributory negligence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs<§ 472 (1957); Cote v,. Palmer, 127 Conn. 321, 16 A.2d 595 (1940); Brock v. Peabody
Cooperative Equity Exchange, 186 Kan. 657, 352 P.2d 37 (1960); Callais v. Furniture
Showroom, Inc., 213 So.2d 537 (La. App. 1968); Brown v. Ross, 345 Mich. 54, 75 N.W.2d
68 (1956); Texas & 'P. Ry. v. Hoyle, 421 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
18 Only when Cardozo applied the doctrine to the facts of Wagner did he employ the
word negligence. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 182, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921).




situation with which to expand the rescue doctrine. Here there was no negligence
- only the breach of the implied warranty of merchantibility and the resulting
rescue.
Historically, the law of breach of warranty was clearly. in tort, -developing
from the action on the case for deceit.2" With the later evolution of the action
of assumpsit, breach of warranty began to become intertwined with the law of
contract.2 Dean Prosser refers to breach of warranty in terms that best sum-
marize its early growth as "a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort
and contract."22 Long after the shift over to contract, breach of warranty still
retained aspects of the law of torts&
In 1938 the Court of Appeals of New York faced the question of whether
or not a breach of implied warranty, where personal injury results to the person
given the warranty, is a tortious act by the person breaching the warranty."
In granting recovery under the New York Wrongful Death statute, the court
stated: "Though the action may be brought solely for breach of implied
warranty, the breach is a wrongful act, a default and in its essential nature a
tort.3
25
The historical development of liability for breach of warranty in New York
paralleled the evolution of the law in other jurisdictions. In 1923, for example,
it was the general rule in New York that "a manufacturer or'seller of-food,
or other articles of personal property, is not liable to third persons, under an
implied warranty, who have no contractual relations with him"; " 6 in 1961, the
New York courts, though not discarding the 1923 law, expanded the meaning
of "purchaser" to include all members of the actual purchaser's household;27
and one year later, in an action for breach of express warranty -by a remote
purchaser who had relied on a manufacturer's advertising, they dispensed alto-
gether with the privity requirement. 2 While the holding in this latter case was
deemed to be limited to the particular facts, the court seemed to express a willing-
ness to abandon the privity requirement entirely and turn to strict liability. "
Building on this case, the New York courts clearly made a break from old
doctrines with the 1963 case of Goldberg v. Kollsmanr Instrument Corp.s0 In
that case, a passenger on a commercial airline was killed when -the plane in
which she was riding crashed as a result of a defective altimeter. In a suit by the
passenger's estate, the court-refused to extend the privity rule to hold the manu-
facturer of the altimeter liable, but it did allow the estate to recover against
the manufacturer of the airplane, even though there was no privity between
the passenger and the manufacturer. 1 In doing so, the New York court held the
20 1 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATION OF LEGAL LIABILrY 389 (1906).
21 Id.
22 Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
23 Greco v. S.S.Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557, 1 N.Y.S.2d - (1938).
24 Id. at 31-32, 12 N.E.2d at 560.
25 Id. at 34, 12 N.E.2d at 561.
26 Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 472, 139 N.E. 576, 578 (1923).
27 Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 200, 173 N.E.2d 773, 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42
(1961).
28 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363. (1962).
29 Id. at 16, 181 NE.2d at 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
30 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
31 Id. at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
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manufacturer strictly liable in tort and noted as the purpose for the rule: "to
see to it that the cost of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers who put the products on the market rather than by injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves .... 2 The court summarized
the law on breach of warranty for New York to now be: "A breach of warranty,
it is now clear, is not only a violation of the sales contract out' of which the
warranty arises but is a tortious wrong .... ,"
The Guarino court bases its decision squarely on the rescue doctrine as
propounded by Cardozo.3 ' "We do not believe that the theory of the action,
whether it be negligence or breach of warranty, is significant where the doctrine
of 'danger invites rescue' applies." 5 The court appears to read the doctrine as
providing a separate cause of action, the elements of which are (a) a wrongful
act creating a situation dangerous to life or limb (not caused by the rescuer);
(b) an attempted rescue in response to the situation which was neither rash nor
wanton; and (c) injury to the rescuer. The wrongful act of the defendant placed
Rooney in the dangerous situation. The court points out that the rescuers had
no time for reflection, and to require of them an analysis of the nature of the
wrongful act would be an illogical standard.
Once breach of implied warranty has been recognized as a wrongful act,
the application of the rescue doctrine eliminates any further considerations of
the ordinary breach of warranty case, even with its modem liberal standards."
Judge Scileppi, concurring in result only, argues that the expansion of the
doctrine is unnecessary and too broad."8 He would rather limit the decision
"to cases of great moral obligation."39 The application of such a standard would
be the imposition of a kind of privity requirement for rescuers. This requirement
of moral obligation would demand that the rescuer first determine if the original
wrong was breach of warranty and if so then decide if he has a close enough
relationship with the imperiled individual. Such a requirement would be contrary
to the true purpose of the doctrine - to encourage the saving of lives.
Judge Scileppi also foresees "a myriad of situations where the application
of the doctrine would result in unjustified liability to manufacturers."' 4 In the
rescue doctrine itself, safeguards are present to preclude unjustified liability."1
The case of Brown v. Ross points out that the doctrine only applies where the
effort to rescue is reasonable."2 The test as to what is reasonable is the conduct of
32 Id.
33 Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
34 Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d
942 (1969).
35 Id. at 464, 255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
36 Id. at 464, 255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
37 The court, quoting from the Appellate Division's holding, states the conclusion that
"the rescuer's status as a user or non-user of a defective instrumentality is not directly relevant
to our analysis." Id. at 465, 255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
38 Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 176, 306
N.Y.S.2d 942, 947 (1969).
39 Id. 2it 466, 255 N.E.2d at 176, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 946. The great moral obligation which
the Judge refers to is that which had arisen among the members of the crew and their re-
lationships with one another as parts of a unit.
40 Id. at 466, 255 N.E.2d at 176, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
41 Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921).
42 345 Mich. 54, 75 N.W.2d 68 (1956).
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an ordinarily prudent person in the same circumstances. In Provenso v. San,1
Judge Scileppi himself states that "more than a mere suspicion of danger to the
life of another is requisite before the doctrine should be implement ed.",' The
application of these limitations will effectively prevent abuse of the Guarino
interpretation of the rescue doctrine.
At this time, when it appears that more and more products are being
defectively designed or manufactured,45 it would seem that the Guarino de-
cision will be called on to provide recovery to the persons hearing the cry of
distress of which Cardozo spoke.4 6 It will not matter whether the victim's cause
of action is based in negligence, breach of warranty or strict liability in tort.
The doctrine seeks allocation of the injury of the rescuer to the individual at
fault. If the courts determine that public policy requires that the manufacturer
bear the burden of the defective product, they likewise should include the loss
incurred by the person meeting the requirements of the doctrine.
This decision was arrived at in the true tradition of common law develop-
ment. The 1871 rescue doctrine of Eckert v. Long Island R.R. was limited in
scope to avoiding the use of the defense of contributory negligence against the
rescuer. 7 The policy the court sought to implement, namely that efforts to pre-
serve life should be encouraged, was far broader than the decision itself."
Cardozo gave a statement of the doctrine more in line with the underlying policy,
but the cases following Wagner did not present the need to read Wagner in its
full capacity.49 With the interpretation of a breach of warranty as a wrongful
act, the fact pattern of Guarino finally provided a case beyond the bounds of
negligence to read Cardozo's statement - "danger invites rescue" - as it was
written." In Guarino the court refused to rewrite these words as "negligently-
caused danger invites rescue." The logic of the decision made on a straight-
forward fact situation and coupled with the basic reasoning of Cardozo lend
weight to the belief that this decision will be followed by other jurisdictions as
the problem arises.
James T. Dunn
43 23 N.Y.2d 256, 244 N.E.2d 26, 296 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1968).
44 23 N.Y.2d 256, 261, 244 N.E.2d 26, 28, 296 N.Y.S.2d 322, 325-26 (1968). See adso
Cote v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 321, 16 A.2d 595 (1940).
45 TIME, Mar. 23, 1970, at 72-80.
46 Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437 ('1921).
47 Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871).
48 Id. at 505, 3 Ara. Rep, at 723.
49 Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
50 Id. at 180, 133 N.E. at 437.
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